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Security and privacy in online social networking:  
risk perceptions and precautionary behaviour 
Abstract.  A quantitative behavioural online study examined a set of hazards that 
correspond with security- and privacy settings of the major global online social 
network (Facebook).  These settings concern access to a user’s account and access 
to the user’s shared information (both security) as well as regulation of the user’s 
information-sharing and user’s regulation of others’ information-sharing in relation to 
the user (both privacy).  We measured 201 non-student UK users’ perceptions of risk 
and other risk dimensions, and precautionary behaviour.  First, perceptions of risk 
and dread were highest and precautionary behaviour was most common for hazards 
related to users’ regulation of information-sharing.  Other hazards were perceived as 
less risky and less precaution was taken against these, even though they can lead to 
breaches of users’ security or privacy.  Second, consistent with existing theory, 
significant predictors of perceived risk were attitude towards sharing information on 
Facebook, dread, voluntariness, catastrophic potential and Internet experience; and 
significant predictors of precautionary behaviour were perceived risk, control, 
voluntariness and Internet experience.  Methodological implications emphasise the 
need for non-aggregated analysis and practical implications emphasise interventions 
to promote safe online social-network use. 
Keywords: online privacy; information security; social media; risk perception; 
Facebook; precautionary behaviour 
Highlights 
 We empirically studied users’ response to security- and privacy settings in 
Facebook 
 Perceived risk was highest for user’s information-sharing related to privacy 
 Use habits, attitude and risk dimensions predicted perceived risk  
 Use habits, perceived risk and risk dimensions predicted precautionary behaviour 
 This research has implications for data analysis and interventions 
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1 Introduction 
People are increasingly using online social networks (or social media1), such as 
Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn.  However, information-sharing by social-network 
users can result in violations of privacy (Garg & Camp, 2015) and security (Benson, 
Saridakis & Tennakoon, 2015).  For example, a user whose contact details have 
been revealed may become the subject of harassment in a deliberate, repeated, and 
hostile manner (cyber-bullying) or become a potential victim of identity theft.  It is 
therefore essential to study people’s use of online social networks, especially where 
users are non-specialists in security and privacy, to reduce such violations (Garg & 
Camp, 2015).  In particular, by developing models of human behaviour in relation to 
computer security and -privacy, research has aimed to develop a better 
understanding of this risk-related behaviour (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Liang & 
Xue, 2010).  Risk perceptions continue to play a fundamental role in these models, 
both in security (Huang, Patrick Rau, Salvendy, Gao & Zhou, 2011) and privacy 
(Dinev, McConnell & Smith, 2015). 
In the context of computer systems, three dimensions of information security (the 
protection of information by means of access control) are confidentiality (protection 
from unauthorised reading information), integrity (protection from unauthorised 
writing information) and availability (protection against actions that prevent 
reasonable access by legitimate users to their systems) (Schneier, 2015).  Security 
is considered a necessary, but not sufficient requirement for privacy (Morton & 
Sasse, 2012).  In this research, we study security- and privacy settings in Facebook.   
Various conceptualisations of privacy have been published (e.g., Westin, 1967; 
Zureik & Stalker, 2010).  In relation to online privacy, Dienlin and Trepte (2015) 
distinguish three types: informational privacy (control over the processing and 
transferring of personal information on line), social privacy (regulating proximity and 
distance toward others on line) and personal privacy (perceived control over 
emotional and cognitive outputs).  The current study examines on the second type.  
We focus on privacy settings in social media because they play an important role in 
this regard by providing a mechanism for social privacy. 
                                            
1  The terms ‘online social network’ and ‘social medium’ are used interchangeably in the text. 
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The aim of this research is to study security- and privacy-related risk perceptions and 
precautionary behaviour in social-network use.  Our goals are to (1) determine how 
different potential security- and privacy-related hazards in an online social network 
are perceived, (2) establish to the extent to which people take precautions against 
different potential security- and privacy-related hazards, and (3) ascertain the 
antecedents of risk perception and precautions taken against risk of security- and 
privacy violations. 
2 Theoretical approaches to studying risk perception 
Various approaches to studying risk perception have been published.  For the 
present study, the most significant ones are the following.  Availability (“the ease with 
which instances come to mind”) influences people’s risk perception (Kahneman, 
2011, p. 129).  Saliency (the extent to which an event attracts attention), dramatic 
nature of an event (e.g., a plane crash) and the source of experience (e.g., personal 
experiences) can enhance availability.   According to the affect heuristic, the more 
technologies or activities are associated with positive feelings (e.g., sunbathing), the 
less they are judged to be risky and the more they are judged to be beneficial 
(Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic & Johnson, 2000).   
Starr (1969) used population statistics of human behaviour to infer people’s revealed 
risk-related preferences regarding particular technologies and human activities.  He 
analysed the relationship between risk (the statistical expectation of death per hour 
of exposure) and benefit (the average amount of money spent per individual 
participant or the average contribution made to a participant’s annual income) for 
some common activities.  However, the approach of revealed preferences suffers 
from several shortcomings.  First, preferences may not be stable over time and 
aggregate data do not take into account the variability among hazards (Fischhoff, 
Slovic, Lichtenstein, & Combs, 1978).  Second, the underlying assumption that 
people both have full information and use that information optimally has been refuted 
(Simon, 1956).  Third, different measures of risk and benefit lead to different 
conclusions (Fischhoff et al., 1978). 
Psychometric methods have been used to study expressed risk preferences 
regarding particular technologies and human activities (Slovic, 1987).  This has the 
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advantage of eliciting perceptions (thoughts and judgments) of risk from people who 
are (potentially) exposed to particular risks that are studied, and can provide 
information about the causes of behaviour and potential ways to influence this.  
Applications of the results of work using these methods include risk communication 
(e.g., Young, Kuo & Chiang, 2014; Kim, Choi, Lee, Cho, & Ahn, 2015) and risk policy 
(e.g., Huang, Ban, Sun, Han, Yuan & Bi, 2013).  From a set of risk dimensions (e.g., 
voluntariness, controllability and newness; see Online Appendix OA1), prediction 
equations of risk perception have been developed (Fischhoff et al., 1978).  A 
limitation is that data are usually averaged over hazards.  Therefore, the effect of or 
variability in hazards cannot be analysed, with (other) predictors held constant, and 
the analysis may not predict risk perceptions for individual hazards.  Moreover, there 
is an apparent lack of research showing how risk perceptions ‘translate’ into 
behaviour.  The current research combines the study of expressed preferences and 
revealed preferences.  This enables us to pursue our goals: to quantify variation 
among hazards, and to predict risk perception and precautionary behaviour.  Risk 
perceptions and precautionary behaviour have also been the subject of existing 
research on privacy and security of social media. 
3 Privacy and security of social  media 
Privacy and security are major issues in social media.  First, it has been noted that 
security and privacy design of social media is weak (Acquisti & Gross, 2006), 
thereby creating security- and privacy vulnerabilities. Second, the main purpose of 
social media, information-sharing, inherently has implications for privacy: for 
example, whom to share information with, what to share and how much to share. 
Given these issues, users’ behaviour and underlying risk perceptions becomes even 
more important to protect against security- and privacy hazards. 
Online security in social networks.  Saridakis, Benson, Ezingeard and Tennakoon 
(2016) note an imbalance in behavioural research on online social networks, with 
many studies on privacy, but a dearth of research on security.  They studied how 
social-network use and security perceptions are related to online victimisation.  The 
results showed that with those with high perceived control over personal information 
on social networks, those with high perceived risk propensity on social networks and 
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users of multi-purpose social networks are less likely to be cyber-crime victims, but 
users of knowledge exchange social networks are more likely to be victims. 
Online privacy in social networks. Dienlin and Trepte (2015) distinguish 
informational, social and psychological privacy and study each of these privacy types 
empirically in Facebook.  Based on the reasoned-action approach (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
2011), privacy attitude, intention and behaviour were studied for each of the privacy 
types, but privacy concern was studied more generally, without reference to these 
types.  The authors demonstrate that, for each of the three privacy types, privacy 
concerns were an indirect predictor of privacy behaviour, mediated by privacy 
attitude and privacy intention.  Moreover, privacy attitude was an indirect predictor of 
privacy behaviour, mediated by privacy intention. 
Taddicken (2014) studied willingness to self-disclose in social media rather than 
protecting existing information that a user has already entered as personal content 
rather than how people protect their information that they have already previously 
disclosed as personal content on an online social network.  In disclosure, a 
distinction was made between sensitivity (facts versus sensitive) and access (open 
versus restricted).  The findings show that privacy concerns are not a predictor of 
self-disclosure; perceived social relevance of online social networks are a predictor 
for self-disclosure of open facts and restricted sensitive information; and number of 
social networks used and general willingness to disclose are predictors of self-
disclosure (except for self-disclosure of restricted facts). 
Acquisti and Gross (2006) studied information-sharing by student-Facebook users.  
Various types of personal information were shared to a different extent (most users 
did not share cell-phone number, home-phone number, personal address, class 
schedule and partner’s name; however, a majority did share birthday, political views 
and sexual orientation).  There was little or no relation between participants’ privacy 
attitudes and their information-sharing: students shared particular information, 
although the expressed concern about strangers identifying that information.  As a 
potential explanation for this lack of correlation there was a lack of awareness in a 
significant minority regarding how to change their profile visibility in Facebook.  
Furthermore, a significant minority of users who had not changed the default privacy 
settings in Facebook incorrectly did not believe that any Facebook user can search 
their Facebook profile.  Moreover, more than half of participants underestimated the 
9/50 
 
number of people who could search their profile.  Aware users claimed to be 
satisfied with their visibility and searchability on Facebook because although they 
were concerned about who could access their profiles, they claimed to manage 
these concerns by controlling the information they disclose.   
Garg, Benton and Camp (2014) and Garg and Camp (2015) conducted a survey 
study using the psychometric paradigm to analyse university students’ perception of 
risk to privacy by information-sharing on Facebook.  In their analysis to predict 
perceived risk from (other) risk dimensions, knowledge by those exposed to privacy 
risk was a negative predictor; therefore, the more knowledgeable Facebook users, 
the less perceived risk.  Arguably the most serious limitation of this work is that the 
data were collapsed over hazards in the regression analysis with perceived risk as 
the dependent variable and other risk dimensions as predictors.  Moreover, 
perceived risk was measured as perceived benefit in half of the research 
participants. 
Beldad (2016) found that risk perception and the perceived effectiveness of privacy 
settings were positive predictors of precautionary privacy-related behaviour (social 
privacy) through the use of Facebook privacy settings, but experience (years of 
Facebook use) was a negative predictor.  Using a different outcome measure, 
Beldad (2015) found that positive predictors of personal-information disclosure 
(informational privacy) were benefits of information-sharing, experience and size of 
personal Facebook network.  From these two studies, it follows that the predictors of 
precautionary behaviour and information disclosure differ or have a different sign 
(experience was negative predictor of precautionary behaviour, but a positive 
predictor of information disclosure).   
Caine et al.’s (2011) showed that visualization of audience in an online social 
network can reduce personal-information disclosure relative to textual or numerical 
representation, thereby offering a potential tool for better aligning privacy 
preferences with privacy behaviour.  Halevi et al. (2013) established that openness 
as a personality factor was positively correlated with the extent of posting information 
on Facebook and negatively correlated with strictness of Facebook privacy settings.  
Johnson et al. (2012) investigated Facebook users’ privacy concerns.  Users were 
most concerned about victimisation by thieves using Facebook as a means, 
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employer seeing inappropriate content on their profile or assessing their suitability for 
the company from their profile and sexual predators using Facebook as a means.  
Evaluation and rationale.  Three main gaps are apparent in the literature.  First, 
although risk perception is deemed an important predictor of precautionary 
behaviour in its own right (Huang et al., 2011; Keith, Thompson, Hale, Lowry & 
Greer, 2013) and is an important element of models of risk-related behaviour 
(Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Liang & Xue, 2010), existing research has studied risk 
perception and risky behaviour in relation to online security or online privacy largely 
separately (e.g., Garg and Camp, 2015) or studied perception and behaviour in 
relation to each other without analysing specific hazards (Beldad, 2015; 2016; Shin, 
2010).  An exception is the work by Keith et al. (2013), but their analysis was 
confined to sharing location data and focused on disclosure of (mainly) new 
information (informational privacy) rather than a wider range of precautionary 
behaviours (social privacy) in an online social network.  Another exception is Shin’s 
(2010), who proposed and found evidence for perceived privacy as a predictor of 
perceived security.  However, this work aimed to predict intention to use social 
media rather than to predict precautionary behaviour and did not study risk 
perception. 
Second, in terms of specificity, either no specific behaviour (Beldad, 2015, 2016; 
Dienlin & Trepte, 2015) or only one specific behaviour (Joinson et al., 2010) was 
studied or several behaviours were measured but then analysed by aggregation 
(Garg & Camp, 2015).  Therefore, variance between behaviours in risk perception 
and precautionary behaviour could not be established, although people’s perceptions 
and behaviour may differ depending on the information item that is at stake 
(Kokolakis, 2017).   
Third, several studies did not measure risk perception (Dienlin & Trepte, 2015; 
Taddicken, 2014; Acquisti & Gross, 2006; Cain et al., 2011; Halevi et al., 2013; 
Johnson et al., 2012).  Thus, the role of risk perceptions in shaping specific 
behaviours (as predictors) could not be established.   
The current study addresses these three gaps by studying both security and privacy 
in a social medium, studying specific behaviours and by studying both risk 
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perception and precautionary behaviour in their own right and in relation to each 
other. 
4 Current study 
4.1 Variations in risk perception and precautionary behaviour   
In online security and -privacy the actual risks are usually not known, so 
mechanisms such as availability or the affect heuristic may be even more influential 
than in other domains; for example, news reports can increase the availability of 
particular security- and privacy hazards and thereby increase the associated 
perceived risk, even though objectively the risk may not be increased.  Therefore, 
Research Question 1: how do users of an online social network perceive different 
potential security- and privacy-related hazards in terms of risk, benefit, and other risk 
dimensions? (cf., Fischhoff et al., 1978). 
Moreover, as people may perceive certain social-network related hazards as riskier 
than others, they may (as a consequence) also act more cautiously in relation to 
some hazards than in relation to others (Keith et al., 2013).  Thus, 
Research Question 2: to what extent do users of an online social network take 
precautions against different potential security- and privacy-related hazards? 
4.2 Predicting risk perception and precautionary behaviour 
Extensive research has proposed various risk dimensions (see Online Appendix 
OA1) as predictors of perceived risk that are also relevant to the study of information 
security (Van Schaik, Onibokun, Coventry, Jansen & Kusev, 2017).  From existing 
research and Van Schaik et al. (2017), Table 1 summarises the risk-related 
predictors of perceived risk. 
Therefore, 
Research Question 3: what are the antecedents of risk perception in users of an 
online social network?   
According to existing models of human behaviour such as protection motivation 
theory, as perceived risk increases, people’s propensity to protect against this risk 
also increases (Floyd, Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 2000).  Therefore, the risk 
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dimensions that predict perceived risk (discussed in relation to Research Question 
3), are also potential predictors of precautionary behaviour (see Table 2).  Previous 
research on risk perception supports this idea (Slovic, MacGregor & Kraus, 1987; 
Sjöberg, 2000) as well as the role of experience (Rosenboim, Benzion, Shahrabani & 
Shavit, 2012) and demographics (Layte, McGee, Rundle & Leigh, 2007) as 
predictors.  Thus, 
Research Question 4: what are the antecedents of precautions taken against risk in 
an online social network? 
5 Method 
5.1 Design 
An online survey design was used.  The within-subjects independent variable was 
hazard, with 16 levels (Table 3).  Two further comparisons were also included: 
searching for information on line and cyber-bullying.  For the purpose of this 
research, we define a hazard as a potential threat resulting from a particular privacy- 
or security setting in Facebook to a user’s security or privacy, depending on the 
value that the user has chosen for this setting for their own Facebook account.  We 
studied 16 hazards corresponding to Facebook security- and privacy-related 
settings, divided in four categories that were accessible as different sections through 
Facebook’s user-interface at the time of the study (Table 3).  Regarding security 
setting categories, account access corresponds with the security dimensions 
integrity and availability (Schneier, 2015), whereas information access corresponds 
to the security dimension confidentiality (Schneier, 2015).  Regarding privacy setting 
categories, a user’s regulation of information-sharing and a user’s regulation of 
others’ information-sharing in relation to the user can be considered as two 
specialisations of Dienlin and Trepte’s (2015) privacy type ‘social privacy’: the first 
directed at self and the second directed at others.   
The dependent variables were perceived risk, perceived benefit, risk balance (benefit 
minus risk; Bronfman & Cifuentes, 2003), and perceptions of eight further risk 
dimensions, and precautionary security- and privacy-related behaviour.  Attitudes 
towards information-sharing on Facebook were also measured, and data on 
demographics and Internet use were collected. 
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5.2 Participants 
Respondents were 201 Facebook users (109 male, 92 female; mean age = 42, SD = 
17) from the UK, recruited through an online survey panel service (Maximiles UK 
Ltd).  Consistent with the service’s policy, they received an equivalent of £3 as a 
reimbursement.  Of the sample, 55% had an education level of less than a first 
degree (bachelor’s or undergraduate degree) and 58% was employed or self-
employed.  They were experienced Internet users (mean = 14 years, SD = 5) and 
used the Internet for various purposes besides social networking, most notably 
buying products or services (85%), using websites (84%) and reading news (77%).  
Most used the Internet daily (19% daily, 32% 2-3 times daily and 43% more than 
three times a day) and spent an hour or more on the Internet, once on line (25% 
about one hour, 42% several hours). 
5.3 Measures 
Sixteen items were 4 security settings for access to Facebook account; 4 security 
settings for access to shared information; 4 privacy settings/tools related to user’s 
regulation of information-sharing; and 4 privacy settings related to user’s regulation 
of others’ sharing related to the user’s Facebook content.2.  These 16 items were 
selected because they were related to what were deemed to be Facebook’s most 
clearly described security- and privacy settings at the time of data collection (April 
2014).  Two further comparison items were also included, at opposite ends of 
perceived risk (low: browsing Internet sites for information; high: cyber-bullying).  
These were not (directly) related to security and privacy of social media, but included 
as comparisons in addressing Research Question 1. 
For each item, the following 10 dimensions of risk perception were measured, based 
on Fischhoff et al. (1978), and Bronfman, Cifuentes, Dekay and Willis (2007): 
perceived risk, benefit, voluntariness, immediacy of effect, knowledge about risk by 
affected population, knowledge about risk by science, control over risk, newness, 
(chronic-)catastrophic potential and dread (see Online Appendix OA1 for details).  In 
                                            
2 The two types of privacy setting can be seen as two different mechanisms to achieve social 
privacy (Dienlin & Trepte, 2015), by regulating (1) access to one’s personal online information and 
(2) other’s behaviour in relation to access to one’s personal online information. 
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response to each item (from the set of 16 hazards and 2 comparisons [Table 3]), 
participants had to give a rating on these 10 dimensions of risk perception, using a 7-
point semantic-differential.  For example, for the measurement of risk, participants 
had to rate the risk of each of the 18 items (e.g., sharing their telephone number) by 
way of a 7-point scale with endpoints ‘poses no risk’ (1) and ‘poses great risk’ (7). 
Five standard items from social-cognition research were employed to measure 
attitudes towards sharing information on Facebook (Online Appendix OA1, Section 
1.12; adapted from Davis, 1993); these used a 7-point semantic-differential response 
format, with a more positive attitude indicated by lower scores. Principal component 
analysis of the attitude items yielded a one-factor solution, explaining 77% of 
variance.  Scale reliability was good – Cronbach’s alpha = 0.93.  Therefore, an 
average attitude score was calculated and used in subsequent analysis.   
Items measuring precautionary behaviour in terms of current use of security- and 
privacy-related settings (the 16 listed hazards) used a three-point scale (with 
responses ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘don’t know’; Online Appendix OA1, Section 1.13).  Each of 
these responses was later categorized as ‘safe’, ‘unsafe’ or ‘unknown’ 
(corresponding with an answer of ‘don’t know’) for each hazard.  An answer was 
classified as safe or unsafe depending on whether the hazard was described as not 
taking a precaution or as taking a precaution (e.g., sharing phone number was 
classified as unsafe, but doing secure browsing was classified as safe).   
5.4 Procedure 
Questions on demographics were presented first (Online Appendix OA1, Section 
1.1).  Then for each of the 10 risk dimension questions, the meaning of the risk 
dimension was explained (Online Appendix OA1, Sections 1.2-1.11), and each of the 
16 hazards and 2 comparison activities was presented per question.  For each 
question, the 18 hazards/comparisons were presented consecutively (as a block) in 
random order.  In turn, each block of questions was randomly presented.  Next, the 
attitude questions were presented in random order (Online Appendix OA1, Section 
1.12), followed by the questions on security- and privacy-related settings (Online 
Appendix OA1, Section 1.13), also in random order.  On average, it took participants 
33 minutes to complete the questionnaire. 
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6 Results 
6.1 Analysis of hazards 
In relation to Research Question 1, we analysed how Facebook users perceive 
different security- and privacy-related hazards.  Confidence intervals of the mean 
(Table 4; Figure 1) indicate that perceived risk was highest for cyber-bullying, 
sharing telephone number, failing to (have made arrangements to) receive ‘login 
notifications’ and sharing e-mail address and lowest for browsing Internet sites for 
information.  The converse was true for risk balance (Table 4).  One-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) confirmed that the effect of hazard/comparison activity on risk 
perception, F (17, 3400) = 37.77, 2 = .15, p < .001, and risk balance, F (17, 3400) = 
58.75, 2 = .22, p < .001, was significant. The effect of hazard was also significant 
when Internet-browsing and cyber-bullying were excluded from the analysis.  
Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction for perceived risk showed that 
cyber-bullying was perceived as significantly riskier than all other hazards/activities, 
except sharing phone number.  A similar pattern of results was found for risk balance 
and dread.  Sharing phone number, sharing e-mail address, and failing to receive 
login notifications were perceived riskier than most remaining hazards/activities, but 
each of these did not differ significantly from the other two.  Browsing the Internet for 
information was perceived to be less risky than all other hazards/activities. 
Risk profiles were constructed per hazard/comparison, showing the mean for 
perceptions of risk, benefit, and eight other risk dimensions (Table 5).  
Hazards/activities seemed to differ most on perceived risk, perceived benefit, and 
dread.  Analysis by risk dimension showed that the effect of hazard/comparison was 
significant for all perceived-risk dimensions, indicating significant variability among 
hazards/activities.  The effect was strongest for perceived risk, benefit (both 2 = 
.15), and dread (2 = .12).  When Internet-browsing and cyber-bullying were 
excluded from the analysis, the effect was strongest on perceived risk and dread.  
Perceptions of dread showed the same pattern as perceived risk, with highest mean 
scores for cyber-bullying, sharing telephone number, sharing e-mail address, and 
failing to (have made arrangements to) receive ‘login notifications’, and lowest for 
browsing Internet sites for information. 
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As we studied risk perception of both security and privacy, we also compared risk 
perceptions of the different grouped types of security- and privacy-related hazards.  
Repeated-measures ANOVA (see also Figure 1) showed that the effect of hazard 
category (security/access to account, security/information access, 
privacy/information-sharing, and privacy/timeline and tagging) on perceived risk was 
significant, F (3, 600) = 43.73, p < .001, 2 = .03.  Follow-up tests with Bonferroni 
correction showed that security hazards related to access to account were rated as 
riskier than security hazards related to information access, t (200) = 6.00, p < .001, d 
= 0.19.  Privacy hazards related to regulation of information-sharing were perceived 
as riskier than privacy hazards related to regulation of others’ information-sharing, t 
(200) = 9.17, p < .001, d = 0.33.  Regulation of information-sharing was also riskier 
than access to account, t (200) = 3.34, p < .01, d = 0.10, and information access, t 
(200) = 8.53, p < .001, d = 0.23. 
In relation to Research Question 2, we analysed to what extent users take 
precautions against security- and privacy-related hazards through their Facebook 
settings.  Taking and failing to take precautions were analysed separately, as there 
were also participants who reported not knowing whether they had taken particular 
precautions.  Over 50% of participants reported having taken precautions against 
potential violations of security and privacy through social-network settings for phone 
number (safe not to share), e-mail address (safe not to share), restricted list of 
‘friends’ (safe to keep list) and blocking users (safe to block) (Table 6).   
Moreover, the variables hazard (16 Facebook privacy- and security settings) and 
taking a precaution (yes/other) were not independent, Cramer’s V = .25.  Follow-up 
contrast analysis with Bonferroni correction showed that phone number (more 
precautionary behaviour) differed significantly from all other hazards, except e-mail 
address.  E-mail address (more precautionary behaviour) differed significantly from 
the remaining hazards, except restricted list of ‘friends’ and block users. 
As we studied risk perception of both security and privacy (in contrast to previous 
research), we also compared precautionary behaviour for the different (as in 
Facebook) grouped types of security- and privacy-related hazards.  Repeated-
measures ANOVA (see also Figure 2) showed that the effect of hazard category 
(security/access to account, security/information access, privacy/regulation of 
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information-sharing, and privacy/regulation of others’ information-sharing) on 
precautions was significant, F (3, 600) = 63.64, p < .001, 2 = .17.  Follow-up tests 
with Bonferroni correction showed that security hazards related to information 
access met with more precautions than security hazards related to access to 
account, t (200) = 5.49, p < .001, d = 0.21.  Privacy hazards related to regulation of 
information-sharing met with more precautions than privacy hazards related to 
regulation of others’ information-sharing, t (200) = 12.78, p < .001, d = 0.82.  
Regulation of information-sharing also met with more precautions than both 
information access, t (200) = 7.29, p < .001, d = 0.59, and access to account, t (200) 
= 10.54, p < .001, d = 0.86. 
6.2 Predicting perceived risk and precautionary behaviour 
In relation to Research Question 3, we analysed the antecedents of security- and 
privacy-related risk perception in Facebook.  In the analysis of perceived risk, two 
levels can be distinguished: hazard (at Level 1, 16 hazards, corresponding with 
security- and privacy settings in Facebook, existed) and subject (or participant; at 
Level 2, 201 participants existed).  In relation to different analysis levels (non-
aggregated [e.g., individual respondent] and aggregated [e.g., group]), Pedhazur 
(1997) points out that cross-level inferences (interpreting the results obtained at one 
level [e.g., group] to apply to another [e.g., individual]) “may be, and most often are, 
fallacious and grossly misleading” (p. 677).  Moreover, Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) 
discuss the ecological fallacy: analysing only aggregated data (at a higher level) and 
then interpreting the results at a higher level to apply to a lower level.  In order to 
avoid cross-level inferences and the ecological fallacy, multi-level analysis was 
performed, with perceived risk as the numeric dependent variable and the remaining 
variables (nine risk dimensions as well as attitudes and demographics [see Section 
4]) as predictors.3  The predictor set was constrained through an analysis of 
correlations between demographics and perceived risk, with a cut-off point of .10.  
Only average duration of Internet session exceeded this cut-off.  For comparison 
with previous research (Garg & Camp, 2015), who tested their model of perceived 
                                            
3 The analysis did not include subject (participant) as a random effect.  This is because (1) including 
this random effect substantially inflated the correlation between actual and predicted scores on the 
dependent variable and (2) the finding of a significant random effect of subject is expected and not 
of interest. 
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risk with multiple-regression analysis, Online Appendix OA2 presents corresponding 
results of aggregated multiple-regression analysis.  The difference in results with 
those of multi-level analysis clearly demonstrates the fallacy of cross-level inferences 
and the benefit of conducting non-aggregated analysis. 
In staged model-testing (recommended by Tabachnick & Fidell [2013]), the 
difference between subsequent models was tested (Table 7).  A model with hazard-
related Level-1 predictors (Model 2) explained more variance than the null model 
(without predictors) (Model 1).  Model 3 (Model 2 augmented with interaction effects 
of hazard with the remaining Model-2 predictors) did not explain significantly more 
variance than Model 2.  However, Model 4 (Model 2 augmented with Level-2 
variables) explained significantly more variance than Model 2.  Model 5 (Model 4 
augmented with interaction effects of hazard with Level-1 predictors) explained 
significantly more variance than Model 3 and marginally significantly more than 
Model 4.  Therefore, Model 5 was retained as the final model.  The following results 
are those observed in this final model (Table 8).   
Significant predictors were average duration of Internet session, attitude towards 
using Facebook, voluntariness (over all hazards), dread (over all hazards), hazard, 
catastrophic potential (hazard-specific) by hazard, and dread (hazard-specific) by 
hazard.  Specifically, the results show that the higher dread (over all hazards), the 
higher perceived risk; the lower positive attitude towards sharing information on 
Facebook and the lower voluntariness (over all hazards), the higher perceived risk.  
The effects of hazard-specific catastrophic potential and dread were moderated by 
and therefore varied with hazard.4  Moreover, those who spent several hours per 
Internet session perceived risk to be higher than those in any of the other brackets of 
session length.   
As in previous analyses (see Section 5.1), hazards also differed in perceived risk, 
but here we show that this is the case even with duration of Internet session, 
                                            
4 Follow-up regression analyses per hazard (Table OA1, Online Appendix OA2) were conducted.  
Most consistent were the effects of the negative predictor attitude and the positive predictor dread.  
The results show that the positive predictor catastrophic potential was particularly influential for 
others posting and blocking event invitations; dread was particularly influential for login 
notifications, app passwords, trusted contacts, future-post-sharing, old-post-sharing, e-mail-
sharing, phone number-sharing, others posting, post-sharing (tagged in), restricting posts and 
blocking event invitations. 
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attitudes towards sharing information, and perceptions of other risk dimensions, both 
over all hazards and hazard-specific held constant.  Moreover, the effect of risk 
dimension varied depending on level of aggregation (over all hazards or hazard-
specific).  For example, voluntariness had a negative influence at the level of hazard, 
but not at the level of participant.  There was also evidence of a composition effect of 
dread.5  Dread had a positive effect at the level of participant, but at the level of 
hazard its effect varied with hazard. 
In relation to Research Question 4, we analysed the antecedents of precautionary 
behaviour against security- and privacy-related risk in Facebook.  Although none of 
the demographics exceeded the cut-off point of .10, duration per Internet session 
was retained as a potential predictor, as it was a predictor of perceived risk in the 
previous analysis.  In the analysis of precautionary behaviour, two levels can be 
distinguished: hazard (at Level 1, 16 hazards existed) and subject (or participant; at 
Level 2, 201 participants existed).  As the outcome variable was binary, multi-level 
analysis was performed, with precautionary behaviour (choosing a [relatively] safe 
setting for privacy and security hazards) as the dependent variable and the 
remaining variables as predictors.6  To demonstrate the fallacy of cross-level 
inferences, Online Appendix OA3 presents corresponding results of aggregated 
multiple-regression analysis. 
In staged model-testing (recommended by Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013), the difference 
between subsequent models was tested (Table 9).  A model with hazard-related 
Level-1 predictors (Model 2) explained more variance than the null model (Model 1).  
Model 3 (Model 2 augmented with interaction effects of hazard with the remaining 
Model-2 predictors) explained significantly more variance than Model 2.  However, 
Model 4 (Model 2 augmented with Level-2 variables) also explained significantly 
more variance than Model 2.  Model 5 (Model 4 augmented with interaction effects of 
hazard with all Level-1 predictors) explained significantly more variance than Model 
                                            
5  A composition effect is the extent to which the relationship at a higher level adds to or differs from 
the relationship at a lower level (Heck, Thomas & Tabata, 2010). 
6 Again subject (participant) was not included as a random effect (1) in order to avoid substantial 
inflation of the correlation between taking precautions and the predicted probability of taking 
precautions and (2) because the finding of a significant random effect of subject is expected and 
not of interest 
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3 and Model 4.  Therefore, Model 5 was retained as the final model.  The following 
results are those observed in this final model (Table 10). 
Significant predictors were average duration of Internet session, perceived risk (over 
all hazards), control (over all hazards), hazard, voluntariness (hazard-specific), 
perceived risk (hazard-specific) by hazard, and knowledge to science (hazard-
specific) by hazard.  Specifically, the results show that the higher risk (over all 
hazards) and voluntariness (hazard-specific), the greater the odds of precautionary 
behaviour; the lower control (over all hazards), the greater the odds of precautionary 
behaviour.  The effects of hazard-specific perceived risk and knowledge to science 
were moderated by and therefore varied with hazard.7  Moreover, for those who 
spent about 30 minutes and for those who spent about 45 minutes per Internet 
session the odds of precautionary behaviour were higher than for those spending 
several hours. 
Some further observations are worth noting here.  As in previous analyses (see 
Section 5.1) hazards also differed in precautionary behaviour, but here we show that 
this is the case even with average duration of Internet session, attitudes towards 
sharing information, and perceptions of other risk dimensions, both over all hazards 
and hazard-specific held constant.  Moreover, the effect of risk dimension varied 
depending on level of aggregation (over all hazards or hazard-specific).  For 
example, risk had a positive influence at the level of participant, but not at the level of 
hazard; however, the opposite was true for voluntariness.  Moreover, control had a 
negative influence at the level of participant, but not at the level of hazard.  Although 
in the previous analysis attitude towards sharing information on Facebook was a 
significant negative predictor of perceived risk it was marginally significant as a 
negative predictor of precautionary behaviour. 
6.3 Summary of results 
The analysis of hazards showed significant variation among hazards in perceived 
risk, benefit, other risk dimensions (voluntariness, immediacy of effect, knowledge 
                                            
7 Follow-up logistic regression analyses per hazard (Table OA2, Online Appendix OA3) were 
conducted.  The results show that the positive predictor perceived risk was particularly influential 
for old-post-sharing, e-mail-sharing, and post-sharing (tagged in); knowledge to science was 
particularly influential for login notifications and post-sharing (tagged in). 
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about risk by affected population, knowledge about risk by science, control over risk, 
newness, (chronic-)catastrophic potential and dread) and precautionary behaviour.  
Facebook users perceived privacy hazards related to regulation of information-
sharing as riskiest and privacy hazards related to regulation of others’ information-
sharing as least risky.  Precautionary behaviour was most frequent for regulation of 
information-sharing and least frequent for privacy hazards related to regulation of 
others’ information-sharing and access to account. 
Significant positive predictors of students’ risk perceptions were dread, catastrophic 
potential and length of Facebook session; significant negative predictors were 
attitude towards sharing information on Facebook and voluntariness (see also Table 
1).  Significant positive predictors of precautionary behaviour were perceived risk 
and voluntariness;8 significant negative predictors of  precautionary behaviour were 
control and length of Facebook session (see also Table 2). 
7 Discussion 
The aim of this research is to study security- and privacy-related risk perceptions and 
precautionary behaviour in social-network use.  Our goals are to (1) determine how 
different potential security- and privacy-related hazards in an online social network 
are perceived, (2) establish to the extent to which people take precautions against 
different potential security- and privacy-related hazards, and (3) ascertain the 
antecedents of risk perception and precautions taken against risk of security- and 
privacy violations.  We first discuss our findings on variation among hazards, and the 
prediction of perceived risk and precautionary behaviour in relation to existing work.  
We then discuss implications of our work, make recommendations, and present 
limitations of this work and ideas for future work. 
7.1 Risk perception of hazards and precautionary behaviour 
Although previous research (Garg & Camp, 2015) analysed students’ risk 
perceptions of Facebook security and privacy hazards, differences among hazards 
                                            
8 We consider the finding that voluntariness (hazard-specific) was a statistical significant positive 
predictor of precautionary behaviour as a consequence of suppression.  This is because the 
bivariate correlation between voluntariness and precautionary behaviour was negative (r = -0.03) 
and not significant.  Therefore, further interpretation of this predictor is precluded. 
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were not statistically tested.  Our results are novel as we statistically test differences, 
not only in terms of perceived risk, but also other risk dimensions and precautionary 
behaviour.   
Perceptions of risk and dread were highest and precautionary behaviour was most 
common for regulation of information-sharing hazards related to privacy settings.  
The specific hazards/activities that were judged most risky were cyber-bullying, 
sharing telephone number (consistent with Acquisti & Gross’s [2006] results on 
privacy concern), sharing e-mail address and failing to (have made arrangements to) 
receive ‘login notifications’.  The high risk score of cyber-bullying is not surprising 
(see also Van Schaik et al., 2017), as it can be seen as a direct psychological and/or 
physical threat, and as a consequence rather than as an action.  In addition, news 
reports in the media of cyber-bullying may lead to high availability (Kahneman, 2011) 
and cyber-bullying may be associated with strong negative feelings (Finucane et al., 
2000), both adding to a high degree of perceived risk or being targeted by a social-
engineering attack.  Sharing telephone number and sharing e-mail address do not 
pose a direct threat, but the information that is being shared can lead to the sharing 
social-media user, for example, becoming the subject of cyber-bullying.  Similarly, 
without login notifications a social-medium user may not be aware of other users 
accessing their account; however, as a result, the accessed information can lead to 
users getting fired, getting arrested or being refused insurance when they allow 
posts that include compromising information to be shared with others. 
Overall, perceived risk and the extent of precautionary behaviour were greater for 
privacy hazards related to regulation of information-sharing than hazards related to 
the other three categories (security/account access, security/information access and 
privacy/regulation of others’ information-sharing).  This may be because potential 
negative consequences of a lack of regulation of information-sharing have higher 
availability than those of other types of hazard.  For example, it is straightforward to 
imagine that once a person with malicious intent has acquired a Facebook user’s 
phone number or e-mail address they can use this information to harass the user.  
The effect sizes in favour of privacy/information-sharing were greater for 
precautionary behaviour (large or medium to large) than for perceived risk (small or 
small to medium), so precautionary behaviour is a more sensitive measure.  This 
may be because precautionary behaviour for a particular Facebook setting requires 
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that Facebook users are aware of the setting, are concerned about security or 
privacy in relation to the setting and can find the setting in the user-interface.  
However, answering a risk rating question does not require any of these; therefore, 
the range of ratings may be smaller than that of precautionary behaviour. 
7.2 Antecedents of risk perception and precautionary behaviour 
Previous research tested the predictive power of risk dimensions for perceived risk in 
Facebook security or -privacy (Garg & Camp, 2015), but this work suffered from 
aggregated data analysis.  Moreover, there seems to be a lack of research testing 
risk perception predictors of precautionary behaviour. 
Risk perception.  Antecedents of risk perceptions were differentiated in terms of 
those that were hazard-specific (Level 1) and subject-specific predictors (Level 2).  
Together, these were analysed using multi-level analysis (Heck et al., 2010).  
Positive predictors of perceived risk were dread (over all hazards), duration of 
Internet session and also dread and catastrophic potential, both hazard-specific, 
moderated by hazard.  These findings lead us to conclude the following.   
First, the higher dread of security and privacy hazards overall, the higher perceived 
risk.  This is consistent with previous work (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Garg & Camp, 
2015).  Therefore, the more a Facebook user perceived dread in relation to security- 
and privacy hazards overall, the riskier they perceive specific hazards to be.  This 
may be particularly relevant to hazards associated with information-sharing on 
Facebook, as reliable data on risks are hard to come by.  In addition, our results 
show that the hazard-specific effect of the predictor dread was moderated by hazard.  
In particular, the effect of dread was strongest for privacy settings for regulation of 
information-sharing (average beta = 0.26), which had the highest mean risk ratings, 
and weakest for privacy settings for regulation of others’ information-sharing 
(average beta = 0.15), which had the lowest mean risk rating.  Therefore, it seems 
that the effect of is stronger for hazards that are perceived as riskier.  In particular, 
these results indicate a composition effect: for privacy settings that involved 
regulation of information-sharing perceived risk was higher as a Facebook user’s 
perceived dread for the specific setting increased, in addition to the positive effect of 
the user’s perceived dread overall, across settings.   
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Second, those who spent several hours per Internet session perceived risk to be 
higher than those in other time brackets.  Reported average duration of Internet 
session may be a proxy for experience in Facebook use.  Consistent with this 
interpretation, those who are more experienced in a particular activity perceive 
greater risk (Lehtonen, Havia, Kovanen, Leminen & Saure, 2016), due to specific 
dangers that they have encountered in the past or because they may have 
developed a better understanding of the risks due to their experience (increased 
knowledge). 
Third, regarding the hazard-specific effect of catastrophic potential (as in the domain 
of Internet security; Van Schaik et al., 2017), this was positive for privacy- and 
security hazards that restrict what other Facebook users can do to the user’s 
Facebook content (allowing others to post, restricting post visibility and blocking 
event invitations).  Therefore, the more catastrophic the risks associated with these 
hazards, the greater perceived risk.  This may be because other Facebook users’ 
behaviour introduces additional unpredictability (Omata, 2012).   
Negative predictors were attitude towards sharing information on Facebook and 
lower voluntariness (over all hazards).  These results indicate, first, that, in line with 
previous work (Sjöberg & Drottz-Sjöberg, 2009), the more Facebook users have a 
positive attitude towards Facebook the less they perceive the risk associated with 
Facebook’s specific security- and privacy settings.  This result is consistent with 
Sjöberg’s (2000) claim that attitudes drive beliefs (risk perceptions) and also with the 
affect heuristic (Finucane et al., 2000), according which affect has a negative effect 
on perceived risk.  In 3D virtual worlds for online learning, risk perception regarding 
insider threats may be explained by the affect heuristic (Farahmand & Spafford, 
2013).  In particular, the authors suggest that, as less experienced users will have 
reduced knowledge regarding cyber-security, they will rely more affect than on 
logical risk analysis to make judgements about risk.  Both in 3D virtual worlds and in 
social media, the power of the affect heuristic to influence risk perception may be 
further increased by a lack of reliable data on risks. 
Second, (as in the domain of Internet security; Van Schaik et al., 2017) the less 
voluntary a Facebook user perceives exposure to security- and privacy hazards 
overall to be, the riskier they perceive specific hazards to be.  This finding provides 
supports for the idea that the more voluntary risks are perceived to be the less risky 
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they are perceived to be (Starr, 1969).  This is in particular important in the use of 
social networks such as Facebook, as their use may normally be seen to be 
voluntary, so risk perception may be reduced.  This, in turn, could then result in risk 
underestimation and consequently in less safe online behaviour on the network 
(Huang et al., 2011). 
Precautionary behaviour.  In our multi-level analysis, perceived risk (over all 
hazards) was a positive predictor of precautionary behaviour.  The more Facebook 
users perceived risk associated with Facebook security- and privacy hazards overall, 
the more likely was it that they had chosen safe privacy- and security settings.  This 
finding is consistent with the idea that perceived risk is an important predictor of 
precautionary behaviour in its own right (Huang et al., 2011; Keith et al., 2013) and 
with the role of perceived risk as an important factor in models of risk-related 
behaviour (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Liang & Xue, 2010).   
The effect of the predictor hazard-specific perceived risk was moderated by hazard.  
The predictor was strongest and positive for privacy settings that involved 
information-sharing.  The results indicate a composition effect: for each of these 
settings, precautionary behaviour was more likely as a Facebook user’s perceived 
risk for the specific setting increased, in addition to the positive effect of the user’s 
perceived risk overall, across settings. 
Negative predictors of precautionary behaviour were control (over all hazards) and 
length of Internet session.  First, according to previous work (Adams, 2012), in 
general when people feel in control they act less cautiously.  Our results support this 
idea (as in the domain of Internet security; Van Schaik et al., 2017), the more a 
Facebook user felt in control in relation to security- and privacy hazards overall, the 
less likely they were to have chosen specific safe privacy- and security settings. 
Second, average duration of Internet session was a significant predictor, with those 
who spent 30 or 45 minutes per Internet session (and who may therefore be deemed 
less experienced social-media users) acting with more precaution than those 
spending several hours.  Similarly, Rosenboim et al. (2012) found a reduction in 
precautionary behaviour with those who were more experienced.  On the one hand, 
according to the ‘personal experience hypothesis’, people become less sensitive to 
specific risks they face, as a result of experiencing similar events (Yechiam, Barron 
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& Erev, 2005).  Moreover, more experience may result in greater availability and 
thereby elevated risk perception (Kahneman, 2011).  An important difference 
between Yechiam et al.’s work and our study is that in the former (objectively and, 
even more important, subjectively based on their experience) participants could not 
control the hazards (missile attacks), whereas in the latter participants could fully 
control the hazards (Facebook security- and privacy settings).  In any case, our 
findings demonstrate that more experienced users perceive greater risk (because of 
greater experience), but take fewer precautions (because of desensitisation) 
indicating the need for verification in further research.  Alternatively, perhaps more 
experienced users take other precautions than the ones that we measured.  For 
instance, consistent with our finding that control was a negative predictor of 
precautionary behaviour, they may control the information they reveal on Facebook 
to avoid breaches of privacy (Acquisti & Gross, 2006) or delete tags and photos 
(Young & Quan-Haase, 2013).9 Otherwise, trust could provide an explanation for the 
findings: experienced users may have fewer Facebook contacts (‘friends’) whom 
they trust or experienced users may have built considerable trust in their contacts 
over considerable time as a Facebook user.  In either case, as a consequence, 
experienced users’ perceived need for precautionary behaviour and their actual 
precautionary behaviour may be reduced.  
7.3 Implications 
The specific aim of this research is to study security- and privacy-related risk 
perceptions and precautionary behaviour in social-network use.  A major 
methodological advance over previous work that aimed to predict risk perceptions in 
social media is our use of non-aggregated analysis (see Van Schaik et al. [2017] for 
another application of this analysis in the domain of Internet security).  Our results of 
this analysis identify significant antecedents and consequents of risk perception at 
different levels (hazard-specific and over hazards).  This way, we avoid the 
ecological fallacy of aggregated analysis, which is incomplete and can be misleading 
                                            
9 The effect of the positive predictor knowledge to science (hazard-specific) was moderated by 
hazard.  However, no particular pattern was found, with the predictor for individual hazards mostly 
not significant and either positive or negative. 
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(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).  From our results, we draw the following practical 
implications. 
Implications from analysis of differences between hazards.  Although perceived risk 
and precautionary behaviour was lower for the four Facebook privacy settings for the 
regulation of others’ information-sharing (see Table 4), they may still be precursors 
of direct threats.  Therefore, interventions to promote risk awareness should 
especially target each of these as well. 
Furthermore, security hazards associated with access to Facebook account were 
perceived as riskiest and evoke less precautionary behaviour (less than 40% of 
participants) (see Tables 2 and 4) than privacy hazards associated with information-
sharing (more than 75%).  Therefore, interventions to promote risk awareness 
should especially target each of these. 
Implications from analysis of predicting perceived risk.  Based on our results of multi-
level analysis to predict perceived risk (see Table 8), interventions to promote risk 
awareness of information-sharing should (1) especially target Facebook users who 
have a more positive attitude towards using social media and those who spend less 
time per Internet session; (2) in general, emphasize dread associated with hazards 
of information-sharing; (3) in general, emphasize hazards of information-sharing 
even if they are seen as voluntary; (4) emphasize the catastrophic potential of 
particular hazards of information-sharing10; and (5) emphasize dread associated with 
particular hazards of information-sharing11. 
Implications from analysis of predicting precautionary behaviour.  Based on our 
results of multi-level analysis to predict precautionary behaviour (see Table 10), risk 
interventions to promote precautionary behaviour in relation to information-sharing 
on social media should (1) especially target Facebook users who spend the most 
time per Internet session; (2) in general, emphasize risks to users’ security and 
privacy associated with information-sharing; (3) in general, emphasize the potential 
threat of any hazards of information-sharing even if they are seen as controllable; (4) 
                                            
10 allowing others to post on one’s timeline, failing to restrict posts and failing to block event 
invitations 
11 failing to set up login notifications, failing to set up trusted contacts, allowing the sharing of future 
posts, olds posts, e-mail address, and phone number, allowing others to post on one’s timeline, 
allowing post-sharing (tagged in), failing to restrict posts and failing to block event invitations 
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emphasize the potential threat of individual hazards of information-sharing even if 
they are seen as involuntary; (5) emphasize the risk of particular hazards of 
information-sharing12; and (6) emphasize the importance of acting with precaution in 
relation to particular hazards of information-sharing even if they are well understood 
by science13.  Moreover, as our results show that perceived risk is an important 
predictor of precautionary behaviour, the implications from the former are linked to 
the latter.  In other words, interventions that target perceived risk should thereby 
indirectly also impact on and benefit precautionary behaviour.  However, it is 
important to consider that interventions emphasizing threat under low-efficacy 
conditions have almost no or even negative effects on behaviour (Kok, Bartholomew, 
Parcel, Gottlieb & Fernández, 2014).  Therefore, interventions also need to boost 
users’ self-efficacy beliefs and response efficacy (Jansen & Van Schaik, 2017).  
Another consideration is the apparent mismatch between increased perceived risk 
and reduced precautionary behaviour in experienced Facebook users.  A solution 
could be to ‘resensitise’ experienced users to Facebook security- and privacy 
hazards by emphasising both risk and self-efficacy (specifically by persuading them 
with straightforward effective actions to enhance their security and privacy on 
Facebook). 
Different types of intervention are available to promote precautionary behaviour (Van 
Schaik et al., 2017).  These include education-based interventions (Caputo, 
Pfleeger, Freeman & Johnson, 2014), marketing-linked interventions (Reid & Van 
Niekerk, 2016) and interventions using specific design features (Coventry, Briggs, 
Jeske & van Moorsel, 2014).  We illustrate potential specific interventions with 
hazards privacy settings for regulation of others’ information-sharing (see Table 3).  
In a marketing intervention (Reid & Van Niekerk, 2016), members of the target 
population of Facebook users may receive persuasive messages, warning of specific 
potential negative consequences of allowing others control of information-sharing on 
one’s timeline.  After all, when risks are underestimated it can encourage people to 
demonstrate unsafe behaviour (Huang et al., 2011).  In an education intervention 
(Caputo et al., 2014), users may develop knowledge about potential negative 
                                            
12 sharing old posts and e-mail address, and allowing post-sharing 
13 failing to have made arrangements for allowing post-sharing where the user is tagged in 
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consequences of allowing others control and how to prevent this in the first place by 
choosing appropriate Facebook privacy settings.  In a design intervention (Coventry 
et al., 2014), a set-up program may review a user’s Facebook privacy settings with 
the user on first-time use (and at subsequent time intervals) and at that time present 
the potential consequences of different privacy settings.  The aim is to help inform 
the user to make appropriate choices as decided by the user. 
7.4 Limitations and future work 
A consideration regarding the generalizability of our results is the type of online 
social network studied.  We examined the online personal social network Facebook.  
Another major system, LinkedIn, is an online professional social network.  Twitter 
can be seen as a personal social network or a microblog, although it is seen mainly 
as an information network.14  We would expect our results potentially not to 
generalize to other types of social network, given differences in purpose, context of 
use and functionality between these networks, with potential consequent differences 
in risk perception and precautionary behaviour.  For example, even though our 
hazard items could be adapted to measure risk perception in a different professional 
social network, sharing a phone number with others may be cause for concern in a 
personal social network, but may be essential when one uses LinkedIn to get a job.  
However, our findings may generalize to online personal social networks other than 
Facebook.  Therefore, future research may study the antecedents and consequents 
or risk perception across different types of social network and establish potential 
moderators. 
Another limitation is that we studied Facebook users’ reported security- and privacy 
settings.  As some users did not remember some of their specific settings and 
because the settings that they did report may not be fully accurate, future research 
may produce more accurate results by analysing the actual rather than the reported 
settings. 
Furthermore, victim status (having been a victim of a specific security- or privacy 
breach related to one’s Facebook settings) could sensitise users to risk and the need 
                                            
14 http://www.inc.com/issie-lapowsky/ev-williams-twitter-early-
years.html?cid=em01011week40day04b 
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for precautionary behaviour.  Therefore, future research should consider including 
this status as a predictor of perceived risk and precautionary behaviour.  In addition, 
although we identified significant predictors of risk and behaviour as outcomes, 
further intervention research will be needed to establish how and to what extent 
these predictors (as mediators) can be manipulated to enhance these outcomes.  
Moreover, although the protection of all social-network users’ security and privacy is 
important, this applies even more users who are more vulnerable to potential 
security- and privacy hazards.  While this research examined adult Facebook users, 
future work should consider studying specific vulnerable user groups, building on 
existing work such as Silva, Barbosa, Silva, Silva, Mourão and Coutinho’s (2017) 
study of teenagers’ privacy on Facebook. 
8 Conclusion 
Using psychometric methods in a quantitative empirical online study, we analysed 
Facebook users’ security- and privacy-related risk perceptions and precautionary 
behaviour.  The main contributions of our work lie in demonstrating variation 
between hazards in people’s risk perceptions related to security and privacy in social 
networks; and identifying predictors of perceived risks and precautionary behaviour 
in Facebook use in relation to existing research in risk perception and security.  The 
main implications are the empirical demonstration that non-aggregated data analysis 
can help avoid methodological fallacies and derived recommendations for 
behavioural interventions with regard to security and privacy in Facebook use.  We 
encourage future research to build on our insights, as part of a larger effort to better 
understand the determinants of people’s propensity to protect themselves from 
potential security- and privacy-related hazards in social media and beyond.  For 
example, our detailed insights into the influence of risk perception on precautionary 
behaviour could inform the inclusion of specific risk perception dimensions in models 
such as protection motivation theory when applied to online security and privacy. 
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Table 1 
Predictors in relation to risk perception 
Predictor D L1 L2 
Lack of voluntariness (Starr, 1969; AC) +   
Lack of immediacy (Kahneman, 2011; AC) -   
Lack of knowledge by affected population (Garg & Camp, 2015) +   
Lack of knowledge by science (Garg & Camp, 2015) +   
Lack of control (Adams, 2012; Rhee, Ryu & Kim, 2012; AC) +   
Lack of newness (Schneier, 2015; Malin & Sweeney, 2001) -   
Catastrophic potential (Adams, 2012; Acquisti & Gross, 2006; AC) + I  
Dread (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Garg & Camp, 2015; Schneier, 2015; AC) + I  
Benefit (Finucane et al., 2000; Chakraborty, Lee, Bagchi-Sen, Upadhyaya & Raghav Rao, 2016) -   
Attitudes (Sjöberg & Drottz-Sjöberg, 2009) -   
Experience/availability (Kahneman, 2011) +   
Note.  D: expected direction of prediction.  L1/L2: Test result at Level 1 (hazard)/Level 2 (participant, over hazards) in mixed-model 
analysis.  Statistically significant.  I: Significant interaction with hazard. AC: Author Citation 1.
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Table 2 
Predictors in relation to precautionary behaviour 
Predictor D L1 L2 
Risk (Boss, Galletta, Lowry, Moody & 
Polak, 2015) 
+ I  
Benefit -   
Voluntariness +   
Lack of immediacy -   
Lack of knowledge by affected population +   
Lack of knowledge by science + I  
Control (AC) -   
Lack of newness -   
Catastrophic potential +   
Dread +   
Experience (Rosenboim et al., 2012) -   
Note.  D: expected direction of prediction.  L1/L2: Test result at Level 1 
(hazard)/Level 2 (participant, over hazards) in mixed-model analysis.  Statistically 
significant.  I: Significant interaction with hazard. AC: Author Citation 1.
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Table 3 
Hazards and comparison activities studied  
Hazard/comparison activity Default setting in Facebooka Protection 
provided by 
defaultb 
Related to security settings for access to 
Facebook account 
  
1 Failing to do ‘secure browsing’ Off (i.e., not allowing yourself ‘secure 
browsing’) 
Poor 
2 Failing to (have made arrangements to) 
receive ‘login notifications’ 
None (i.e., not allowing yourself ‘login 
notifications’) 
Poor 
3 Failing to use ‘app passwords’ None (i.e., not allowing yourself ‘app 
passwords’) 
Poor 
4 Failing to use ‘trusted contacts’ None (not allowing yourself ‘trusted 
contacts’) 
Poor 
Related to privacy settings/tools for user’s 
regulation of information-sharing 
  
5 Allowing all your future posts to be shared 
with others 
Friends Neutral 
6 Allowing all your old posts to be shared 
with others 
Off (if this attribute [Limit Past Posts] 
is switched on, old posts will only be 
shared with friends) 
Good 
7 Allowing your e-mail address to be shared 
with others 
Everyone Poor 
8 Allowing your phone number to be shared 
with others 
Everyone Poor 
Related to privacy settings/tools for user’s 
regulation of others’ information-sharing 
  
9 Allowing others to post on your timeline Friends Neutral 
10 Failing to review friends’ posts before they 
appear on your timeline; these are posts in 
which a link to your profile is included 
Off (i.e., not allowing yourself to 
review posts ‘friends’ tag you in 
before they appear on your timeline) 
Poor 
11 Allowing others’ posts to be shared on 
your timeline; these are posts in which 
others have included a link to your profile 
Friends of friends Poor/neutral 
12 Failing to review links that appear in your 
posts; these are links to others’ Facebook 
profile that others have inserted before 
they appear on Facebook 
Off (i.e., not allowing yourself to 
review tags people add to your post 
before tag appears on Facebook) 
Poor 
Related to security settings for access to 
shared information in Facebook 
  
13 Failing to keep a restricted list of ‘friends’ 
who can only see the information and 
posts that you make public 
None (i.e., not having a restricted list 
…) 
Poor 
14 Failing to block users so they can no 
longer see things you post on your 
timeline, tag you, invite you to events or 
groups, start a conversation with you or 
add you as a ‘friend’ 
None (i.e., not allowing yourself to 
block …) 
Poor 
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15 Failing to block event invitations None (i.e., not allowing yourself to 
block …) 
Poor 
16 Failing to block apps, so they can no 
longer contact you or get non-public 
information about you through Facebook 
None (i.e., not allowing yourself to 
block …) 
Poor 
Comparison activity   
17 Browsing Internet sites for information   
18 Cyber-bullying   
aat the time of data collection (April 2014). bOur assessment; see also Section 6.1. 
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Table 4
Means for risk and risk balance
Mean Mean
Hazard Lower limit Upper limit Lower limit Upper limit
Security/access to Facebook account
1 Secure browsing 4.91 4.69 5.12 -1.53 -1.89 -1.17
2 Login notifications 5.23 5.02 5.43 -1.94 -2.31 -1.57
3 App passwords 4.86 4.65 5.07 -1.24 -1.55 -0.94
4 Trusted contacts 4.55 4.33 4.76 -0.98 -1.27 -0.68
Privacy/information-sharing
5 Allowing future post-sharing 4.88 4.67 5.09 -1.24 -1.55 -0.94
6 Allowing old post-sharing 4.84 4.63 5.05 -1.40 -1.70 -1.09
7 Allowing e-mail sharing 5.19 4.97 5.41 -1.81 -2.17 -1.45
8 Allowing phone-sharing 5.38 5.15 5.62 -2.26 -2.64 -1.88
Privacy/timeline and tagging
9 Allowing others posting 4.50 4.27 4.72 -0.74 -1.07 -0.40
10 Reviewing posts 4.49 4.30 4.68 -0.97 -1.25 -0.68
11 Allowing post-sharing 4.53 4.33 4.73 -0.79 -1.08 -0.49
12 Reviewing tags 4.42 4.22 4.63 -1.02 -1.31 -0.74
Security/access to information-sharing
13 Restricting posts 4.88 4.65 5.10 -1.36 -1.70 -1.03
14 Blocking users 4.66 4.44 4.87 -1.06 -1.37 -0.75
15 Blocking event invitations 4.07 3.84 4.30 -0.47 -0.78 -0.15
16 Blocking apps 4.62 4.39 4.85 -0.97 -1.29 -0.64
Comparison activity
17 Internet browsing 3.56 3.35 3.77 1.86 1.55 2.16
18 cyber-bullying 5.60 5.41 5.79 -2.82 -3.18 -2.45
CI .95 CI .95
Risk Risk balance
 
Table 5
Mean ratings on perceived risk and other dimensions of risk, sorted by perceived risk
Risk Benefit Volunta-
riness
Immediacy 
of effect
Knowledge 
(population)
Knowledge 
(science)
Control 
over risk
Newness Catastrophic 
potential
Dread
Cyber-bullying 5.60 2.79 4.62 3.28 4.10 3.71 4.03 4.21 4.71 5.12
Phone number 5.38 3.12 3.55 3.67 3.98 3.76 5.13 4.61 3.87 4.77
Login notifications 5.23 3.29 3.89 3.69 4.21 3.77 4.77 4.12 3.82 4.58
E-mail address 5.19 3.38 3.54 3.75 4.02 3.69 5.03 4.60 3.65 4.68
Secure browsing 4.91 3.38 3.70 3.92 4.16 3.76 4.96 4.43 3.80 4.19
Future posts 4.88 3.64 3.43 4.16 4.29 4.03 4.90 4.34 3.80 4.05
Restricted list of 'friends' 4.88 3.51 3.38 3.92 4.14 3.97 5.00 4.41 3.77 4.02
App passwords 4.86 3.62 3.51 4.09 4.46 4.00 5.01 4.08 3.68 4.16
Old posts 4.84 3.44 3.56 4.02 4.21 4.03 4.94 4.59 3.76 3.95
Block users 4.66 3.60 3.46 3.83 4.27 3.78 4.97 4.27 3.83 4.02
Block apps 4.62 3.65 3.62 3.91 4.20 3.91 4.86 4.17 3.74 4.00
Trusted contacts 4.55 3.57 3.46 4.20 4.36 4.04 4.89 3.99 3.66 4.03
Post-sharing 4.53 3.74 3.62 3.93 4.15 4.04 4.73 4.23 3.74 3.85
Others posting 4.50 3.76 3.54 3.68 4.10 3.94 4.88 4.38 3.72 3.78
Post review 4.49 3.52 3.64 3.83 4.19 4.03 4.79 4.40 3.72 3.92
Tag review 4.42 3.40 3.54 3.95 4.20 4.07 4.81 4.23 3.76 3.87
Block events 4.07 3.60 3.42 3.94 4.37 3.90 5.03 4.26 3.59 3.71
Browsing Internet 3.56 5.42 3.19 3.82 3.81 3.50 5.00 5.10 3.49 3.01
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Table 6
Precautionary behaviour in relation to hazards, sorted by precaution taken
Precaution taken Precaution not taken Precaution unknown
Phone number 72 17 11
E-mail address 65 22 13
List of 'friends' 58 27 15
Block users 55 26 18
'Secure browsing' 50 20 30
Old posts sharing 44 26 29
Block apps 44 28 28
New posts sharing 43 29 28
'Login notifications' 42 29 28
Post-sharing 37 37 26
Block event invitations 37 42 20
Others posting in timeline 34 48 17
Review tags 34 41 25
'Trusted contacts' 34 46 20
Review posts 32 44 24
'App passwords' 26 46 27
Note . Numbers are percentages.  Not all row totals add up to 100% because of rounding.
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Table 7
Model testing, dependent variable perceived risk
df -2LL r  (pv, risk)
1 Null model 2 12058.97 0.00
2 Level-1 predictors
a
26 11630.60 0.35
3 Level-1 predictors and interactions with hazard 161 11472.37 0.41
4 Level-1 and Level-2 predictors
b
40 11363.61 0.44
5 Level-1 and Level-2 predictors and interactions with hazard 175 11200.98 0.48
Model
 
Model difference chi square df p Dr  (pv, risk)
M1 - M2 428.37 24 0.000 0.35
M1 - M3 586.60 159 0.000 0.41
M1 - M4 695.36 38 0.000 0.44
M1 - M5 857.99 173 0.000 0.48
M2 - M3 158.23 135 0.084 0.06
M2 - M4 266.99 14 0.000 0.09
M3 - M5 271.39 14 0.000 0.08
M4 - M5 162.63 135 0.053 0.04
Test of model difference
 
catastrophic potential and dread
and dread
voluntariness, immediacy, knowledge by population, knowledge by science, control, newness, catastrophic potential
Note . pv: predicted value. Null model: intercept only. Level 1: hazard. Level 2: subject (participant).
a
hazard, benefit, voluntariness, immediacy, knowledge by population, knowledge by science, control, newness, 
b
average duration of Internet session and attitude towards the use of Facebook as well as, averaged over hazards, benefit, 
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Table 8
Parameter estimates and tests of effects, dependent variable perceived risk
Parameter b df1 df2 F p
LL UL
Level 2/subject
Av. duration of Internet session 4 3216 17.67 <0.001
From 1 to about 15 minutes vs several hours -0.47 -0.65 -0.29 1 3216 27.01 <0.001
About 30 minutes vs several hours -0.22 -0.36 -0.08 1 3216 8.89 0.003
About 45 minutes vs several hours -0.73 -0.92 -0.53 1 3216 53.86 <0.001
About 1 hour vs several hours -0.17 -0.30 -0.05 1 3216 7.48 0.006
Attitude towards Facebook use 0.19 0.15 0.23 1 3216 90.15 <0.001
Benefit (subject) -0.06 -0.12 0.01 1 3216 2.81 0.094
Voluntariness (subject) -0.09 -0.15 -0.03 1 3216 7.83 0.005
Immediacy (subject) 0.05 -0.02 0.12 1 3216 2.11 0.146
Knowledge to population (subject) 0.04 -0.03 0.11 1 3216 0.98 0.322
Knowledge to science (subject) -0.03 -0.11 0.04 1 3216 0.85 0.356
Control (subject) 0.00 -0.06 0.07 1 3216 0.01 0.904
Newness (subject) -0.03 -0.09 0.03 1 3216 0.92 0.337
Catastrophic potential (subject) 0.02 -0.05 0.09 1 3216 0.31 0.578
Dread (subject) 0.25 0.18 0.32 1 3216 48.28 <0.001
Level 1/hazard
Hazard 15 3216 6.58 <0.001
Benefit (hazard) -0.03 -0.15 0.10 1 3216 0.16 0.690
Voluntariness (hazard) 0.09 -0.03 0.21 1 3216 2.25 0.134
Immediacy (hazard) -0.01 -0.14 0.12 1 3216 0.02 0.887
Knowledge to population (hazard) 0.04 -0.10 0.18 1 3216 0.29 0.591
Knowledge to science (hazard) -0.06 -0.21 0.09 1 3216 0.60 0.440
Control (hazard) 0.06 -0.08 0.19 1 3216 0.76 0.385
Newness (hazard) 0.01 -0.11 0.14 1 3216 0.04 0.839
Catastrophic potential (hazard) 0.08 -0.06 0.22 1 3216 1.16 0.281
Dread (hazard) -0.02 -0.15 0.11 1 3216 0.07 0.795
Benefit (hazard) by hazard 15 3216 1.15 0.307
Voluntariness (hazard) by hazard 15 3216 1.38 0.145
Immediacy (hazard) by hazard 15 3216 1.10 0.352
Knowledge to population (hazard) by hazard 15 3216 1.46 0.112
Knowledge to science (hazard) by hazard 15 3216 1.05 0.403
Control (hazard) by hazard 15 3216 0.63 0.853
Newness (hazard) by hazard 15 3216 0.92 0.545
Catastrophic potential (hazard) by hazard 15 3216 1.71 0.042
Dread (hazard) by hazard 15 3216 1.67 0.050
Note . All predictors, except average duration of Internet session and hazard, are mean-centred.
Figures in bold indicate a significant test result at the 0.05 significance level.
CI 95%
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Table 9
Model testing, dependent variable safe precautionary behaviour
df -2LL r  (pp, pb)
1 Null model 1 4415.03 0.00
2 Level-1 predictors
a 26 4120.11 0.30
3 Level-1 predictors and interactions with hazard 176 3914.22 0.39
4 Level-1 and Level-2 predictors
b 41 4044.59 0.33
5 Level-1 and Level-2 predictors and interactions with hazard 191 3840.72 0.41
Model
 
Model difference chi square df p Dr  (pp, pb)
M1 - M2 294.92 25 0.000 0.30
M1 - M3 500.81 175 0.000 0.39
M1 - M4 370.44 40 0.000 0.33
M1 - M5 574.31 190 0.000 0.41
M2 - M3 205.89 150 0.002 0.09
M2 - M4 75.51 15 0.000 0.03
M3 - M5 73.50 15 0.000 0.02
M4 - M5 203.87 150 0.002 0.08
Test of model difference
 
b
average duration of Internet session and attitude towards the use of Facebook as well as, averaged over hazards, risk, benefit, voluntariness, 
immediacy, knowledge by population, knowledge by science, control, newness, catastrophic potential and dread
a
hazard, perceived risk, benefit, voluntariness, immediacy, knowledge by population, knowledge by science, control, newness, catastrophic potential
Note .  pb: precautionary behavior. pp: predicted probability of precautionary behavior. Null model: intercept and uniform predictor. Level 1: hazard. Level 
2: subject (participant).  Analysis of a null model with intercept only by the SPSS procedure GENLINMIXED produces erroneous results for -2LL that 
cannot be compared with subsequent models having one or more predictor.  The problem was resolved by including an auxiliary uniformly distributed 
predictor in the null model that was correlated with neither the dependent variable nor any of the predictor variables.
and dread
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Table 10
Parameter estimates and tests of effects, dependent variable safe precautionary behaviour
Parameter OR df1 df2 F p
LL UL
Level 2/subject
Av. duration of Internet session 4 3024 9.73 <0.001
From 1 to about 15 minutes vs several hours 1.08 0.81 1.43 1 3024 0.28 0.599
About 30 minutes vs several hours 0.57 0.45 0.72 1 3024 22.83 <0.001
About 45 minutes vs several hours 0.60 0.44 0.83 1 3024 9.87 0.002
About 1 hour vs several hours 1.08 0.89 1.32 1 3024 0.60 0.440
Attitude towards Facebook use 1.06 1.00 1.14 1 3024 3.46 0.063
Risk (subject) 1.17 1.04 1.31 1 3024 7.13 0.008
Benefit (subject) 1.08 0.97 1.20 1 3024 1.97 0.160
Voluntariness (subject) 0.91 0.83 1.01 1 3024 2.98 0.085
Immediacy (subject) 0.97 0.87 1.09 1 3024 0.25 0.615
Knowledge to population (subject) 0.90 0.80 1.01 1 3024 3.23 0.073
Knowledge to science (subject) 1.11 0.99 1.25 1 3024 3.24 0.072
Control (subject) 0.88 0.79 0.98 1 3024 5.16 0.023
Newness (subject) 0.96 0.87 1.05 1 3024 0.84 0.361
Catastrophic potential (subject) 1.02 0.91 1.14 1 3024 0.09 0.766
Dread (subject) 0.91 0.80 1.02 1 3024 2.67 0.102
Level 1/hazard
Auxiliary uniformly distributed predictor 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 3024 0.04 0.841
Hazard 15 3024 8.57 <0.001
Risk (hazard) 0.97 0.82 1.16 1 3024 0.09 0.769
Benefit (hazard) 1.11 0.90 1.37 1 3024 0.94 0.332
Voluntariness (hazard) 1.21 1.00 1.45 1 3024 3.97 0.046
Immediacy (hazard) 0.99 0.81 1.22 1 3024 0.01 0.913
Knowledge to population (hazard) 0.98 0.79 1.22 1 3024 0.04 0.849
Knowledge to science (hazard) 1.04 0.83 1.32 1 3024 0.13 0.722
Control (hazard) 0.85 0.68 1.06 1 3024 2.09 0.148
Newness (hazard) 1.04 0.85 1.26 1 3024 0.13 0.721
Catastrophic potential (hazard) 0.96 0.77 1.19 1 3024 0.13 0.718
Dread (hazard) 1.14 0.93 1.39 1 3024 1.65 0.199
Risk (hazard) by hazard 15 3024 2.75 <0.001
Benefit (hazard) by hazard 15 3024 0.91 0.552
Voluntariness (hazard) by hazard 15 3024 0.62 0.860
Immediacy (hazard) by hazard 15 3024 0.96 0.496
Knowledge to population (hazard) by hazard 15 3024 0.96 0.491
Knowledge to science (hazard) by hazard 15 3024 2.06 0.009
Control (hazard) by hazard 15 3024 0.96 0.496
Newness (hazard) by hazard 15 3024 0.73 0.756
Catastrophic potential (hazard) by hazard 15 3024 0.91 0.551
Dread (hazard) by hazard 15 3024 1.25 0.226
CI  95%
Note . All predictors, except the uniformly distributed auxiliary predictor, average duration of Internet session 
and hazard, are mean-centred.
Analysis of a null model with intercept only by the SPSS procedure GENLINMIXED produces erroneous results 
for -2LL that cannot be compared with subsequent models having one or more predictor.  
The problem was resolved by including an auxiliary uniformly distributed predictor in the null model that was 
correlated with neither the dependent variable nor any of the predictor variables.
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Figure 1.  Mean perceived risk by Facebook setting.
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Figure 2.  Precautionary behaviour by Facebook setting.
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